Resolving the Somalia crisis: negotiating with the AL Shabaab

Abstract

My thesis engages narratives that seek to explain why actors in the Somali insurgency have not explored the possibility of negotiations with the Al-Shabaab as a political solution to the insurgency despite the futility of the military efforts prioritized. Somalia has been mired in conflict for more than three decades with no clear end to the war in sight. To reach plausible conclusions, the study objectives analysed Somalia’s history, the major attempts by regional actors to end the insurgency, the major actors in the country’s war ecology and analysed why the different attempts to end the insurgency have not progressed to formal negotiations. Analysing this phenomenon is an entry point to understanding how Somalia’s historical continuities drive and sustain insurgencies that manifest in different forms in different periods. Following a historical research design and a qualitative approach through documentary reviews and key informant interviews, I begin with pre-colonial Somalia, clans and Islam to demonstrate how these laid a foundation that makes it impossible to develop a modern state with a central authority that has the monopoly of violence to ensure every Somalis' security. I revisit the country's colonial history and how it birthed Pan-Somali nationalism, the postcolonial history and how a combination of these contributed to the eventual total state failure in 1991 that allowed different non-state armed actors to thrive within the country. I discuss the different efforts that have been undertaken to resolve the conflict in Somalia since 1991 explaining why these efforts were and remain futile. I analyse the intricate war ecology that is rife with a myriad of actors, convergences, divergences, interests and aspirations since 2004. I tease out why the conflict has attracted multiple well-meaning but misguided foreign interventions which frustrate efforts of conflict resolution. The multiple foreign interventions not only alienate the Somalis’ but delegitimise the Federal Government and weakens it making it perpetually dependent on foreign support. A factor that makes the Al-Shabaab popular among the Somalis and justifies their cause. I inquire into why efforts to resolve the insurgency have not progressed to negotiations by analysing the factors that precipitate negotiations and how they are playing out in the Somali insurgency. The findings point to the fact that Somalis have never accepted to cede their geographical space to the control of foreign powers as manifested through the different wars fought since the colonial days and Pan-Somali Nationalism that presently manifests through the desire to establish an Islamic Caliphate. With regard to governance, the Somalis still prefer to be governed through their ancient clan system a fact that makes the country ill-prepared to adopt the Westphalia model of the modern state thus frustrating any efforts to that end. A country that is strategically located and endowed with natural resources, it has attracted multiple foreign interventions that not only sustain the war but create other humanitarian crises like famine and displacement. I concluded by observing that much as the insurgency is ripe, the actors are not ready for negotiations. The study challenges the notion popularised by the Global War on Terror of ‘never negotiating with terrorists as this blurs the legitimate drivers of insurgencies and creates forever wars. The study recommends that actors in the insurgency should explore a political solution of ending the insurgency rest Somalia will remain at an equilibrium of ‘NO WAR, NO PEACE.